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Abstract 
 
 We estimate energy expenditure for the US and world economies from 1850 to 2012. 
Periods of high energy expenditure relative to GDP (from 1850 to 1945), or spikes (1973–74 
and 1978–79) are associated with low economic growth rates and periods of low or falling 
energy expenditure with high and rising economic growth rates (e.g. 1945–1973). Over the 
period 1960–2010 for which we have continuous year-to-year data for control variables 
(capital formation, population, and unemployment rate) we estimate that, statistically, in order 
to enjoy positive growth, the US economy cannot afford to spend more than 11% of its GDP 
on energy. Given the current energy intensity of the US economy, this translates in a minimum 
EROI of approximately 11:1 (or a maximum tolerable average price of energy of twice the 
current level). Granger tests consistently reveal a one way causality running from the level of 
energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) to economic growth in the US between 1960 and 
2010. A coherent economic policy should be founded on improving net energy efficiency. This 
would yield a “double dividend”: increased societal EROI (through decreased energy intensity 
of capital investment), and decreased sensitivity to energy price volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Debate still continues about the relative contributions of production factors to 
economic growth. Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 1979) apart, economists have largely ignored the 
role of materials (e.g. metals) in the economic process. The attention paid to land vanished 
when modern industrial growth shifted the emphasis to capital availability. The importance of 
routine labor and human capital (knowledge, skills, etc.) has never been questioned, probably 
simply because economics is by essence the study of a human system in which humans must 
play the leading part. The role of energy in the economic process has come in for much 
discussion. In addition to the economic literature that we will investigate more specifically in 
the following subsections, the role of energy in society has been considered from sociological 
and anthropological (Podolinsky, 1880; Spencer, 1880; Ostwald, 1911; Soddy, 1926; White, 
1943; Cottrell, 1955; Tainter, 1988), ecological (Lotka, 1922; Odum, 1971), and historical 
(Pomeranz, 2000; Kander et al., 2013; Wrigley, 2016) perspectives. The economic literature 
on the relationship between energy and economic growth splits into two1 streams of research: 
(i) Mainstream econometric analyses of the relationship between energy price/quantity and 
economic growth; and (ii) the biophysical paradigm and its approach to the economic system 
through net energy and energy-return-on-investment (EROI). 
1.1 The contribution of econometrics to the energy–economic growth 
relation 
Energy prices and economic growth  
Hamilton (1983) was the first of a score of studies concentrating on the relation 
between energy prices (usually the oil price) and economic growth (Katircioglu et al, 2015; 
Lardic and Mignon, 2008). Because the oil price impacts economic growth asymmetrically,2 
the classical methods of cointegration are ineffective, and more sophisticated methods are 
required to evaluate the energy price–economic growth relation (Lardic and Mignon, 2008; An 
et al., 2014). The scarcity of data on energy prices (across different countries and over time) 
complicates the assessment of this relation. In a nutshell, this literature seems to converge 
toward a feedback relation between variations in energy price and economic growth 
(Hanabusa, 2009; Jamil and Ahmad, 2010), ranging from a negative to a positive effect 
depending on the level of oil-dependency of the country under study (Katircioglu et al, 2015); 
and a clear negative inelastic impact of the oil price on GDP growth rates for net oil-importing 
countries. In addition, Naccache (2010) has shown that the impact of the energy price on 
economic growth depends on the origin of the oil price shock (supply, demand, or pure 
speculative shock), taking into account that the relative importance of each of these shock-
drivers has varied considerably over time (Benhmad, 2013). When reviewing the literature, we 
found that all these studies consider that the oil price can exert a constant effect on an 
economy between two dates, whereas the energy intensity of this economy may obviously vary 
greatly over the same period of time. Just as the studies rightly assume that low- and high-
energy intensive countries would not react in exactly the same way when confronted with 
                                                     
1 In fact a third stream of research concerns theoretical economic models. We choose not to discuss this literature for the sake of 
space but one of the authors of the present paper has recently contributed to this field (see Court et al., 2016). 
2 The asymmetric response of the economy to the variation of the oil price can be explained by different factors such as the 
monetary policy, the existence of adjustment costs, the presence of uncertainty affecting investment choices and the asymmetric 
response of oil-based products to oil price variations. In the case of an oil price variation, the different adjustment costs may result 
from sector shifts, change in capital stock, coordination problems between firms, and uncertainty. When combined, these 
adjustment costs can completely erase the benefits associated with a fall in the oil price. See Lardic and Mignon (2008) and also 
Naccache (2010) for more information. 
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increased energy prices, (because the former are clearly less vulnerable), the same point should 
also be taken into account for a given country studied at different times. We therefore 
recommend explicitly introducing energy intensity as a key variable in future diachronic 
empirical assessments of energy price–economic growth relations. 
 
Energy quantities and economic growth  
Another impressive array of studies focuses on the relation between quantities of energy 
consumed and economic growth. Such studies have been conducted since the seminal paper of 
Kraft and Kraft (1978). From this energy quantity–economic growth nexus, four assumptions 
have been envisaged and systematically tested: 
 A relation of cause-and-effect running from energy to economic growth. Studies 
supporting this assumption come close to the thinking of the biophysical 
movement (presented in the following subsection) and the proponents of the peak 
oil, because it gives a central role to energy in the economic process.  
 A causal relation running from economic growth to energy. In this situation, 
energy is not essential and energy conservation policies can be pursued without 
fear of harming economic growth. This conservative view reflects the position of 
many neoclassical economists for whom energy is seen as a minor and easily 
substitutable production factor. 
 A feedback hypothesis between energy and economic growth.  
 The absence of any causal relation between energy and economic growth, which is 
also known as the neutrality assumption. 
 
Unfortunately, after more than forty years of research and despite the increasing 
sophistication of econometric studies, this area of study has not so far led to either general 
methodological agreement or a preference for any of the four positions. More specifically, 
three independent literature reviews (Chen et al., 2012; Omri, 2014; Kalimeris et al., 2014), 
covering respectively 39, 48, and 158 studies, have shown that no particular consensus has 
emerged from this empirical literature and that the share of each assumption ranges from 20% 
to 30% of the total. Various explanations can be suggested for these mixed results, including 
the period under study, the countries in question (the level of development affecting the 
results), the level of disaggregation of the data (GDP or sectorial levels), the type of energy 
investigated (total energy, oil, renewable, nuclear, primary vs. final energy, exergy, etc.), the 
econometric method applied (OLS, cointegration framework, VAR, VECM, time series, panel 
or cross-sectional analysis), the type of causality tests (Granger, Sims, Toda and Yamamoto, or 
Pedroni tests), and the number of variables included in the model (uni-, bi-, or multivariate 
model) (Kocaaslan, 2013; Huang et al, 2008a,b; Wandji, 2013). 
 
1.2 Biophysical economics and energy expenditure 
Biophysical economics 
Despite this lack of consensus about the direction of econometric causality tests 
between energy price/quantity and economic growth, we do not think that the importance of 
energy in economics is invalidated. Suppose we try to determine the effect of energy 
consumption on the average speed of a car traveling between a series of equidistant refueling 
points. If we make a Granger causality test between the fuel bills obtained at each gasoline 
station (representing energy consumption) and the recorded average speed of the car 
(representing GDP growth), it would probably indicate a causal relation running from the latter 
to the former. Indeed, the higher the speed of the car, the higher the energy consumption (and 
 4 
the higher the gasoline bill). But no one can reasonably assume that energy does not play the 
primary role in propelling the car at some speed or other, and that we can cut energy 
consumption without affecting the car’s motion. We believe this reasoning reinforces the third 
strand of thought about the energy–economic growth relation grouping the various lines of 
research in biophysical economics. Two pioneering researchers, Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 
1979) and Odum (1971, 1973), respectively applied the laws of thermodynamics and energy 
accounting principles to the analysis of the economic system in the 1970s. Unfortunately, it 
was not these seminal studies that alerted economics scholars and public opinion to the 
dependence of modern economies on energy, but rather the tremendous negative impacts on 
economic growth of the two oil shocks of the same period. Even so, researchers in this field 
have pursued their efforts and produced very recent syntheses (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012; 
Ayres and Warr, 2009; Kümmel, 2011).  
 
Energy expenditure as a limit to growth 
As said previously, the two oil shocks of the 1970s were stark reminders of the world 
economy’s dependence on fossil energy. Energy expenditure, also called energy cost, is the 
quantity of economic output that must be allocated to obtaining energy. It is usually expressed 
as a fraction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Murphy and Hall (2011a,b) suggest that 
“when energy prices increase, expenditures are re-allocated from areas that had previously 
added to GDP, mainly discretionary investment and consumption, towards simply paying for 
more expensive energy”. These authors show graphically that, between 1970 and 2007, the 
economy of the United States of America (US) went into recession whenever the petroleum 
expenditure of the US economy exceeded 5.5% of its GDP. In addition, Lambert et al. (2014) 
suggest that in the US once energy expenditure rise above 10% of GDP recessions follow.  
Bashmakov (2007) makes a difference between energy cost to GDP ratio and energy 
cost to final consumer income ratio. He identifies energy cost to GDP thresholds of 8–10% for 
the US (4–5% for final consumer income) and 9–11% for the OECD (4.5–5.5% for final 
consumer income) below which he finds almost no correlation between the burden of energy 
expenditure and GDP growth rates. However, when these thresholds are exceeded, the 
economy slows down and demand for energy falls until the energy cost to GDP/consumer 
income ratios are back below their thresholds. Bashmakov (2007) argues that until the ratio of 
energy expenditure to GDP reaches its upper critical threshold, it is all the other production 
factors that determine the rates of economic growth, and energy does not perform a “limit to 
growth” function. “But when energy costs to GDP ratio goes beyond the threshold, it 
eliminates the impact of factors contributing to the economic growth and slows it down, so the 
potential economic growth is not realized”. 
King et al. (2015b) estimate energy expenditures as a fraction of GDP for the period 
1978–2010 for 44 countries representing 93–95% of the gross world product (GWP) and 73–
79% of the IEA’s listed world Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) (>78% after 1994). The 
methodology used by these authors is set out in full in their article but it should be pointed out 
that they consider coal, oil, and natural gas for three sectors (industrial, residential, and 
electricity production), plus non-fossil (nuclear, renewable) electricity production for two 
sectors (industrial and residential). The quantities and prices of these different commodities 
were mostly retrieved from databases of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
King et al. (2015b) aggregate these national energy costs to estimate the global level of energy 
expenditure from 1978 to 2010. They find that this estimated energy cost as a fraction of the 
GWP fell from a maximum of 10.3% in 1979 to 3.0% in 1998 before rising to 8.1% in 2008. 
King (2015) uses these data to perform simple econometric correlation (hence not causal) 
analyses that deliver the following main results: expenditure on energy expressed as a fraction 
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of GDP is significantly negatively correlated with the one-year lag of the annual changes in 
both GDP and total factor productivity, but not with the zero-year lag of these same variables.  
1.3 Missing perspective, goal, and content 
As already stressed, the various energy expenditures estimated by King et al. (2015b) 
were only for the period 1978–2010, and the econometric analyses of King (2015) were not 
designed to infer any temporal causality between energy expenditure and economic growth, 
nor to estimate any potential threshold effect in such a relation. Consequently, we seek to 
achieve two related goals in the present paper. First, we think it is important to extend energy 
expenditure estimates (as fractions of GDP) to a larger time frame, for as many countries as 
possible.3 In the present paper we are able to do this adequately for the US and the global 
economy from 1850 to 2012, and for the United Kingdom (UK) from 1300 to 2008.4 Second, 
we wish to relate the level of energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP to the economic growth 
dynamics in order to quantitatively support the various qualitative results previously advanced 
by Murphy and Hall (2011a,b), Lambert et al. (2014), and King (2015). More precisely, 
focusing on the US due to the availability and consistency of data, we seek to:  
 (i) Perform Granger causality tests to identify the direction of the possible causal relation 
between energy expenditure and GDP growth.  
 (ii) Estimate the ultimate level of energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) above which 
economic growth statistically vanishes. 
 (iii) Express this result in terms of the maximum average price of energy and the 
minimum societal energy-return-on-investment (EROI) that must prevail in the economy 
in order for economic growth to be positive. 
 
The methodology used to estimate the level of energy expenditure as a fraction of 
GDP is developed in section 2. In that section we also present the different equations necessary 
to estimate the ultimate energy expenditure level above which economic growth statistically 
vanishes, and translate this result into the maximum tolerable energy price and minimum 
required EROI of society. We then succinctly present the logic of Granger causality tests. In 
section 3, we first show graphically our estimates of the level of energy expenditure as a 
fraction of GDP for the US and the world economy from 1850 to 2012. Then, we give, for the 
US only, our estimation of the ultimate level of total energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) 
above which economic growth seems statistically impossible. We then express this result as 
the maximum tolerable aggregated energy price (and oil price), or in other words, the 
minimum energy-return-on-investment (EROI), that the energy sector must have in order for 
the US economic growth to be positive. We then give the results of the various Granger 
causality tests for the restricted 1960–2010 period for which data are continuous and 
consistent. In section 4, we discuss our methodology and perform some sensitivity analysis of 
our results. We also compare our energy expenditure estimates for the US and world with the 
one for the UK calculated from 1300 to 2008 using data from Fouquet (2008, 2011, 2014). 
Finally, in section 5, we conclude and propose some research perspectives that would be worth 
investigating as an extension of the present work.  
 
                                                     
3  Fouquet (2011) highlights the danger of focusing on the price of energy rather than the price of energy services when 
considering the long-run because the former ignore major technological improvements. We completely agree with this statement 
and want to highlight that our work takes into account some of this technological progress through the energy intensity of the 
economy. 
4 Naturally, the geographical definition of the “United Kingdom” is quite blurred over such long time span (see Fouquet, 2008 for 
details). 
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2. Methods  
2.1 Estimating energy expenditure  
Equations and boundary 
We note 𝑋𝑗 the level of expenditure of a given energy j produced in quantity 𝐸𝑗 and 
sold at price 𝑃𝑗 in a given economy: 
 
𝑋𝑗  =  𝑃𝑗𝐸𝑗. (1) 
 
In our study, the j energy forms include the following marketed energy: coal, crude oil, natural 
gas, non-fossil electricity (i.e. nuclear and renewable electricity from hydro, wind, solar, 
geothermal, biomass and wastes, wave and tidal) and modern biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel). 
Hence, total expenditure of marketed energy, 𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑, is: 
 
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 = ∑ 𝑋𝑗
𝑗
= 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 . (2) 
 
With 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 as the quantity-weighted average price of aggregated marketed energy:  
 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  = ∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑗
𝐸𝑗
∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑗
, (3) 
 
and 𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 the total supply of marketed energy:  
 
 𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑  = ∑ 𝐸𝑗
𝑗
. (4) 
 
Usually, such estimates of marketed energy expenditure omit traditional biomass energy 
(woodfuel, crop residues5) because they usually represent non-marketed consumption for 
which average annual prices cannot be estimated. Consequently, if such an energy resource is 
omitted from equations (1) and (2), we necessarily underestimate contemporary levels of 
energy expenditure since woodfuel and crop residues still represent 70% of global renewable 
energy consumption nowadays (whereas hydro accounts for 20% and new renewable 
technologies such as wind power, solar PV, geothermal, wave, tidal, wastes, and modern 
biofuels account for the remaining 10%). But most importantly, for times prior to the 1940s 
when traditional biomass represented a large share of the total primary energy supply of many 
countries, we need a proxy for total energy expenditure including non-marketed energies in 
order to have a more accurate idea of the actual level of total energy expenditure. With 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑 
as the quantity of traditional biomass energy, and 𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑆 = 𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑 as the total 
primary energy supply, we define, for a given economy, the proxy of total energy expenditure, 
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦, as: 
 
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦  =
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
(1 −
𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑
𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑆
)
. (5) 
                                                     
5 Formally, fodder supplied to draft animals should be added to traditional biomass energy estimates, but it is generally discarded 
due to difficulties of estimation. This is also the case for traditional windmills and water wheels. 
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In our results we will present a (second best) estimate of total energy expenditure for the US 
and world economy using the “total proxy method” in order to test its consistency with the 
(first best) estimate which includes woodfuel as marketed energy.  
 
Data for the US 
We used several sources summarized in Table 1 in order to estimate the prices of coal, 
crude oil, gas, electricity, woodfuel, and modern biofuels consumed in the US.  
 
Table 1. Sources and original units of the different prices of energies consumed in the US.  
Energy Time and spatial coverage Source Original unit 
Coal 1850-2012: US average 
anthracite price. 
US Census Bureau (1975a, pp.207-
209) from 1850 to 1948; EIA (2012, 
p.215) from 1949 to 2011; EIA (2013, 
p.54) for 2012. 
Nominal $US/80-lb 
from 1800 to 1824; then 
nominal $US/short ton6. 
Oil 1861-1944: US average; 
1945-1983: Arabian Light 
posted at Ras Tanura; 1984-
2012: Brent dated. 
British Petroleum (2015) for the 
entire period. 
Nominal $US/barrel. 
Gas 1890-2012: US average price 
at the wellhead. 
US Census Bureau (1975a, pp.582-
583) from 1890 to 1915; Manthy 
(1978, p.111) from 1916 to 1921; EIA 
(2016, p.145) from 1922 to 2012. 
Nominal $US/thousand 
cubic feet. 
Electricity 1907-2012: US average retail 
price. 
US Census Bureau (1975b, p.827) 
from 1907 to 1959; EIA (2016, p.141) 
from 1960 to 2012. 
Nominal $US 
cents/kWh. 
Woodfuel 1850-2012: US average Howard & Westby (2013, p.67); all 
commodities Warren & Pearson 
(1933, pp. 25-27); Manthy (1978, 
p.90). 
Nominal $US/thousand 
board feet. 
Biofuels 2000-2012: US ethanol (E85). 
2002-2012: US biodiesel 
(B20). 
US Department of Energy (2016) Nominal $US/Gasoline 
Gallon Equivalent.7 
 
In order to express all energy prices in the same convenient unit, i.e. International 
Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars8 per terajoule (abbreviated $1990/TJ), we used the US Consumer 
Price Index of Officer and Williamson (2016) and different energy conversion factors from 
British Petroleum (2015) such as the average energy content of one barrel of crude oil (5.73E-
03 TJ), the average energy content of one metric tonne of hard coal (29.5E-03 TJ), the average 
energy content of one thousand cubic feet of natural gas (1.05E-03 TJ), the average energy 
content of one gasoline gallon equivalent (1.2E-04 TJ), the average energy content of one 
thousand board feet of wood (2.3E-02 TJ), and the terajoule equivalent of one kWh (3.6E-06). 
We present in Figure 1 the resulting prices of coal, oil, gas, electricity, and woodfuel expressed 
in $1990/TJ (biofuels prices are omitted from this figure for the sake of clarity).  
 
                                                     
6 1 metric tonne = 1000 kg = 1.10231 short ton; 80-lb = 36.29 kg. 
7 1 Gasoline Gallon Equivalent = 114,100 BTU. 
8  The International Geary–Khamis 1990 dollar (properly abbreviated Int. G-K. $1990), more commonly known as the 
international dollar, is a standardized and fictitious unit of currency that has the same purchasing power parity as the U.S. dollar 
had in the United States in 1990. 
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Figure 1. Estimations of US energy prices for coal (1850–2012, left scale), oil (1860–2012, left scale), gas 
(1890–2012, left scale), woodfuel (1850–2012, left scale) and electricity (1907–2012, right scale) in $1990/TJ. 
US energy consumption levels were retrieved from EIA (2012, p.341) prior to 1950 
and then EIA (2016, p.7) from 1949 to 2012. The nominal US GDP and deflator estimates 
were retrieved from Johnston and Williamson (2016) in continuous year-to-year time series 
from 1850 to 2012. 
 
Data for the World 
It is of course quite complicated to estimate the average annual price of a given energy 
type at the global scale. To be accurate in such estimations, one should formally have all 
national energy prices and consumption quantities and compute for each year a quantity-
weighted average price of each energy. Given the broad time frame of our analysis, such 
estimation is simply impossible. Consequently, we will use the different energy prices 
estimated for the US as global proxies by considering that international markets are 
competitive and that large spreads between regional energy prices cannot last for long due to 
arbitrage opportunities. This assumption is fairly relevant for oil and gas. On the other hand, 
the hypothesis that the average international prices of coal, electricity, woodfuel, and modern 
biofuels follow their US equivalents is a rather coarse assumption. For instance, in the case of 
coal, transportation costs over long distances can be very high so that spreads between prices 
of two different exporting countries have necessarily occurred in the past. Furthermore, by 
using a single price for coal, we ignore the manifold qualities of coal (from the high energy 
content of anthracite to the lowest quality of lignite). As our coal price estimate is 
representative of anthracite, our coal expenditure estimates are probably high estimations of 
the actual levels of coal expenditure because we surely slightly overestimate the exact quality-
weighted global average price of coal. Computing such a quality-weighted global average 
price of coal would be possible if we knew both the proportions of all the different coal 
qualities in the total global coal production (i.e. the quality mix of the global coal supply) and 
their respective prices, for each year between 1850 and 2012. As far as we know, such data is 
unfortunately not available.  
We retrieved global primary energy productions through the online data portal of The 
Shift Project (2015) which is built on the original work of Etemad and Luciani (1991) for 
1900–1980 and EIA (2014) for 1981–2012. Prior to 1900, we completed the different fossil 
fuel time series with the original five-year interval data of Etemad and Luciani (1991) and 
filled the gaps by linear interpolation. The work of Fernandes et al. (2007) and Smil (2010) 
was used to retrieve historical global consumption of traditional biomass energy (including 
woodfuel and crop residues but excluding fodder and traditional windmills and water wheels). 
The gross world product (GWP) we used comes from Maddison (2007) for 1850 to 1950 and 
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from the GWP per capita of The Maddison Project (2013) multiplied by the United Nations 
(2015) estimates of the global population for 1950 to 2010. In order to obtain GWP estimates 
for 2011 and 2012 we used the real GWP growth rate of the World Bank (2016a).  
2.2 Estimating the maximum level of energy expenditure, the maximum 
tolerable price of energy,  and the minimum EROI of society 
In this section we present the methodology used to estimate the maximum level of 
energy expenditure above which economic growth cannot be positive. Then, we show how to 
translate this result into the maximum tolerable price of energy, or in other words, the 
minimum EROI of society. Although we are pretty confident in using US energy prices as 
global proxies for estimating the global level of energy expenditure, the following equations 
and econometric tests will only be applied to the US due to the lack of availability, 
consistency, and confidence that we have in global estimates of population and capital 
formation (as a fraction of GWP). Indeed, continuous population estimates are readily 
available for the US for the entire period of study of this article, whereas continuous estimates 
of global population are only available since 1950. Regarding gross capital formation as a 
fraction of GDP, the World Bank (2016b) proposes estimates from 1960 to 2013 for the US, 
but only from 1970 to 2013 for the global economy. Moreover, confidence in data is logically 
higher for a well-administered nation like the US than for global estimates. 
 
Multivariate linear regressions of economic growth on energy expenditure, capital formation, 
and labor availability 
In the US case, once total expenditure of marketed energy ( 𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 ) is 
computed, we can perform different multivariate linear regressions. The US GDP growth rate 
(obtained from Johnston and Williamson, 2016) representing the dependent variable can be 
regressed on several explanatory variables, namely: energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP 
(in which all marketed energy forms can be considered, or just a subset such as oil), capital 
formation as a fraction of GDP (retrieved from the World Bank, 2016b), and the US 
population (from Johnston and Williamson, 2016). As we suspect population to be a poor 
proxy for labor availability, we will also test in our regressions the explanatory power of the 
US unemployment rate (provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). The general 
formula of the multivariate linear regression we study is:  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃̇
𝐺𝐷𝑃
= 𝛼 + 𝜃1  
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝜃2
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝜃3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. (6) 
 
 
Where 
𝐺𝐷𝑃̇
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 is the US economic growth rate, 𝛼  is the intercept, 𝜃1  (for which we logically 
anticipate a negative value) represents the sensitivity of the economic growth rate to the level 
of energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP, 𝜃2 is the sensitivity of the economic growth rate to 
the capital formation as a fraction of GDP, and 𝜃3 is the sensitivity of the economic growth 
rate to population first difference ∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. It is important to point out that the main 
advantage of our approach is that it takes into account both the impact of energy prices and 
energy efficiency on economic growth. Indeed, it should be remembered that energy 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP can be broken down as the average price of energy times the 
energy intensity (inverse of energy efficiency) of the economy: 
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 𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 =
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝐺𝐷𝑃
= 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×
∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝐺𝐷𝑃
= 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐸𝐼. (7) 
 
Where EI is the energy intensity of the economy. So, rather than considering only the impact 
of energy price or energy quantity fluctuations on economic growth, as is usually done in 
econometric studies, we suppose here that energy prices impact the economy variously 
depending on the energy efficiency of the economy. The higher the energy intensity of the 
economy, the higher the negative impact of energy price increases.  
 
Maximum tolerable level of energy expenditure 
Using equation (6), it is easy to find the particular value of US energy expenditure (as 
a fraction of GDP) that leads to zero economic growth.  In other words, we can define the 
maximum level of energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) above which positive economic 
growth is impossible. We call 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 this maximum level of energy expenditure, with: 
 
𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = (
𝑋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 =
−𝛼 − 𝜃2
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐷𝑃
− 𝜃3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜃1
. (8) 
 
Maximum tolerable quantity-weighted average price of energy  
Defining the maximum level of energy expenditure above which positive economic 
growth is impossible can be reformulated as the maximum aggregated price of marketed 
energy 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥 that the economy can tolerate to still present a slightly positive growth 
rate. Of course, this hypothetical maximum tolerable price of aggregated energy depends on 
the energy intensity of the US economy as shown in (9): 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
. (9) 
 
Minimum EROI required to enjoy positive economic growth 
Considerable research has been conducted into the concept of energy-return-on-
investment (EROI) of human societies since all organisms or systems need to procure at least 
as much energy as they consume in order to continue in existence. The EROI is the ratio of the 
quantity of energy delivered by a given process to the quantity of energy consumed in that 
same process. Hence, the EROI is a measure of the accessibility of a resource, meaning that 
the higher the EROI, the greater the amount of net energy delivered to society in order to 
support economic growth (Hall et al., 2014). King et al. (2015a) point out that this definition is 
rather loose and that a clear distinction should be made between yearly “power return ratios” 
(PRRs) of annual energy flows and “energy return ratios” (ERRs) of full life cycle energy 
systems (i.e. cumulated energy production divided by total lifetime invested energy) which 
more formally represent EROIs. Understandably, energy return ratios represent integrals of 
power return ratios over the entire life cycle of the energy system under consideration. 
Following King and Hall (2011), an estimate of the yearly or “instantaneous” EROI of 
a given economy (taking into account only marketed energies for which prices are available) 
can be expressed as a function of the quantity-weighted average price of aggregated marketed 
energy, 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, the average monetary-return-on-investment (MROI) of the energy sector (i.e. 
its gross margin), the gross domestic product (GDP), and the total supply of marketed energy 
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑: 
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𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼 =
𝑀𝑅𝑂𝐼
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ×
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝑊𝑃
. (10) 
 
If we replace 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 in (10) by the expression (9) of 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥, we obtain an expression 
of the 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛, which is the minimum societal EROI that the energy system must have in 
order for the economy to enjoy a positive rate of growth: 
 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑀𝑅𝑂𝐼
𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
. (11) 
 
Robustness of econometric regressions and auxiliary tests 
All of our estimations were preceded by unit root tests in order to check the 
stationarity of our time series and avoid spurious regressions. For the various estimations of 
energy expenditure, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) provides conflicting results with 
the KPSS test. When we observe the residuals of the auxiliary regressions of ADF, it seems 
that the outcome of the test is biased by two important outliers occurring in 1974 and 1979 
(years of oil shocks). If we introduce two dummy variables to capture this effect, or if we start 
the test after the oil shocks, the ADF test indicates that the various estimations of energy 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP are stationary. Except for the US population, the tests 
indicate that all other variables (US GDP growth rate, US capital formation as a fraction of 
GDP, and US unemployment rate) are stationary. To save space, outcomes for unit root tests 
are reported in the Appendix.  
Concerning econometric regressions, we report systematically different tests for the 
residuals of the estimations, especially tests of autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson 9 ), 
homoscedasticity (White and Arch tests), and normality of residuals (Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-
Wilk tests). When one of the tests converges toward the assumption of autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity, we use the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance matrix in order to obtain robust standard errors. The stability of the econometric 
coefficients across time is also checked by performing the CUSUM test and the CUSUM 
squared tests. 
2.3 Testing for Granger causality  
The last part or our work consists in studying the temporal causality between US 
energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) and US GDP growth rates between 1960 and 2010. 
There are many causality tests based on different definitions of causality, but the main idea of 
the Granger (1969) causality test is to verify that adding past data of variable X1 to past data of 
variable Y enhances the prediction of present values of variable Y. If the residuals generated 
from a model with variable Y and its past only, and from another model with the past of 
variable Y and the past of variable X1 are significantly different, we can reject the assumption 
of non-causality from X1 to Y and accept the assumption of a causality running from X1 to Y. 
Formally, it consists in running the following Wald test: 
 
𝐻0: ∀ 𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑘], 𝜃1,𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻1: ∃ 𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑘], 𝜃1,𝑖 ≠ 0, 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃1,𝑖𝑋1,𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑖=𝑘
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜃2,𝑖𝑋2,𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=𝑘
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜃3,𝑖𝑋3,𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑖=𝑘
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡 . 
(12) 
                                                     
9 The correlogram of residuals is also checked in order to detect higher order of autocorrelation.   
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We also test the assumption that all the Xj variables are not Granger causing the variable Y by 
testing 𝐻0: ∀ 𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑘], 𝜃1,𝑖 = 𝜃2,𝑖 = 𝜃3,𝑖 = 0, and 𝐻1: ∃ 𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑘] ∪ 𝑗 ∈ [1, … ,3], 𝜃𝑗,𝑖 ≠
0. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 US and global energy expenditure from 1850 to 2012 
US energy expenditure 
In Figure 2a we compare three different estimates of US energy expenditure as a 
fraction of GDP from 1850 to 2012 (excluding or including wood as marketed energy, and 
including wood with the total proxy calculation). We also show in this figure the US 
estimation of King et al. (2015b).  Figure 2b shows the decomposition of our first best estimate 
(including wood as marketed energy) by energy type. In Figure 3 we relate graphically our 
first best estimation of the US level of energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) to the GDP 
growth rate from 1951 to 2010.  
Quite logically, in early industrial times the US level of energy expenditure was low 
for fossil energy (coal, oil, and gas) and non-fossil electricity. In 1850 woodfuel expenditure 
still represented 14% of the US GDP when the overall energy expenditure level was 16%.  The 
low price of coal (cf. Figure 1) explains that total energy expenditure decreased from 1850 
(16%) to the 1900s (8%) despite a huge increase in consumption. From 1910 to 1945, total 
energy expenditure was about 14% of GDP because of ever-increasing (cheap) coal use and 
the newly increasing consumption of (expensive) hydroelectricity. From 1945 to 1973, which 
was the period of highest economic growth rates for the US and all other industrialized 
economies, the level of energy expenditure steadily declined from about 8% to 4%. In 1974 
US energy expenditure surged to 10% of GDP, and in 1979 it reached 14.5%. These well-
known periods, respectively called the first and second oil crisis, pushed industrialized 
economies into major recessions. After the beginning of the 1980s, the level of US energy 
expenditure decreased and reached a minimum of 4.2% in 1998. Then, US energy expenditure 
rose again (mainly because of the oil price) and reached 7.8% in 2008. After a fall to 5.7% in 
2009, US energy expenditure remained around 7% from 2010 to 2012. 
 Figure 2a shows that including traditional biomass energy with the total proxy 
calculation yields a “second best” estimation of total US energy expenditure that is quite 
consistent with the “first best” estimation that includes wood as marketed energy. Hence, for a 
given country for which woodfuel prices are not available, the proxy calculation allows an 
adequate estimation of the order of magnitude of the total energy expenditure level. Similarly, 
if consumed quantity estimations of fodder and traditional windmills and water wheels were 
available without knowing their respective prices, the proxy calculation would be adequate to 
estimate the actual total level of energy expenditure.  
Figure 3 indicates that some economic growth recessions are clearly preceded by 
surges in energy expenditure, and so the importance of energy in such a context cannot be 
ignored. This is obviously the case for the two oil crisis of the 1970s. On the other hand, the 
underlying energy basis is harder to discern for some economic recessions. In 1953, for 
instance, bad monetary policy decisions triggered a demand-driven recession in 1954.  In the 
same way, the 1958 “Eisenhower recession” caused by depressed sales of cars and houses and 
high interest rates seems disconnected from any energy base.  
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Figure 2. US energy expenditure estimates from 1850 to 2012. (a) Excluding wood as marketed energy as in 
King et al. (2015b) vs. including wood as marketed energy vs. total proxy calculation; (b) First best estimate 
decomposition by energy type.  
 
 
Figure 3. US energy expenditure vs. GDP growth rate from 1951 to 2010. 
 
But other political and market-induced economic turmoil are in fact related to energy. 
For instance, though agonizing and crippled by multiple problems, the oil-exporting USSR 
probably collapsed in 1990, and not before, because low and ever decreasing oil prices in the 
early 1990s made its public budget untenable. Similarly, the bursting of the subprime bubble 
of 2007–2008, which initiated the Great Recession, was in place for a few years and was 
probably just waiting for a push that rocketing oil prices made visible. 
Figure 3 is only meant to give qualitative intuitions about the energy-economic growth 
relation but upcoming results will support the main evidence of this article: energy is 
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obviously not the only driver of economic growth but it is surely the most recurrent 
determinant of the economic process. 
 
Global energy expenditure 
Figure 4a shows our estimation of global energy expenditure as a fraction of GWP 
from 1850 to 2012 (excluding or including wood as marketed energy, and including wood with 
the total proxy calculation). This figure also shows the global estimation of King et al. 
(2015b).  Figure 4b shows the decomposition by energy type of our global first best estimate 
including wood as marketed energy. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4. World energy expenditure estimates from 1850 to 2012. (a) Excluding wood as marketed energy as 
in King et al. (2015b) vs. including wood as marketed energy vs. total proxy calculation; (b) First best 
estimate decomposition by energy type. 
World results confirm our analysis of the US energy-economy system. Periods of very high 
energy expenditure relative to GDP (from 1850 to 1945), or surges (in 1973–74 and 1978–79) 
are associated with low economic growth rates. On the contrary, periods of low or decreasing 
energy expenditure (from 1945 to 1973) are associated with high and increasing economic 
growth rates. 
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3.2 Maximum level of energy expenditure, maximum tolerable energy price, 
and minimum required EROI for the US economy  
US economic growth regressions on energy expenditure, capital formation, and labor 
availability 
Table 2 gives the results of the different ordinary least square regressions we have 
performed following equation (6) where US economic growth is the dependent variable and 
US energy expenditure, US capital formation, US population first difference, and US 
unemployment rate are the different explanatory variables.  
Table 2. Results of multivariate regressions of US economic growth on energy expenditure, capital formation, 
and labor availability between 1960 and 2010. 
 
Dependent variable: US GDP growth rate 
Specification  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Constant 
-0.180740 
(0.045554)*** 
-0.260034 
(0.052281)*** 
-0.277873 
(0.052875)*** 
-0.276934 
(0.053082)*** 
-0.264372 
(0.057749)*** 
US oil expenditure 
-0.406652 
(-3.294917)*** 
-0.608737 
(0.131068)***    
US fossil energy 
expenditure   
-0.554234 
(0.118643)*** 
 
  
US total energy 
expenditure including 
wood 
   
-0.475930 
(0.114248)*** 
-0.522700 
(0.152441)*** 
US capital investment 
0.957723 
(0.206976)*** 
1.206830 
(0.205298)*** 
1.288255 
(0.208538)*** 
1.307545 
(0.208708)*** 
1.238985 
(0.223166)*** 
US population first 
difference 
-1.15E-09 
(8.48E-10)     
US unemployment rate  
0.434847 
(0.252110)* 
0.522721 
(0.257490)** 
0.605045 
(0.284391)** 
0.724169 
(0.334816)** 
dum1974 
    
-0.018473 
(0.004933)*** 
dum1979 
    
0.011897 
(0.010671) 
dum1986 
    
-0.017128 
(0.006443)** 
dum2009 
    
-0.031794 
(0.011243)*** 
R² 0.493143 0.533416 0.540681 0.520744 0.583032 
R² Adjusted 0.460790 0.503634 0.511362 0.490154 0.515154 
Residual tests 
     Durbin-Watson 1.683556 1.744475 1.765262 1.687059 1.623818 
White 2.150983** 3.467135*** 3.462751*** 3.514716*** 1.900220* 
Arch (1) 0.170333 2.75E-05 0.025367 0.034475 0.006592 
Jarque-Bera 0.686598 0.454564 0.305434 0.409832 4.152342 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.986928 0.971674 0.972468 0.983263 0.968714 
CUSUM test Stability: yes Stability: yes Stability: yes Stability: yes / 
CUSUM squared test Stability: yes Stability: yes Stability: yes Stability: yes / 
Note: Robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, ***1% level. 
 
In specification (I) we have considered only oil expenditure, capital investment, and US 
population. As suspected, population seems to be a poor proxy for labor as its effect is not 
statistically significant. To correct for this shortcoming, we introduce the US unemployment 
rate in all other specifications (II to V). Therefore specification (II) is similar to specification 
(I) except for the labor proxy. Specification (III) takes into account all three fossil energies 
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(coal, oil, and gas), capital investment, and unemployment rate. In specification (IV) energy 
expenditure includes all fossil energies, non-fossil electricity and wood, whereas specification 
(V) is the same as (IV) with additional dummies to control for the impact of peculiar events, 
namely the two oil shocks (1974 and 1979), the oil counter-shock (1986), and the global Great 
Recession (2009). 
We found a statistically significant (most of the time at 1% level) decreasing relation 
between the US economic growth and the level of energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP 
between 1960 and 2010 for all specifications. Increasing energy expenditure as a fraction of 
GDP is a sufficient condition for a decline in US economic growth but this factor is not a 
necessary condition for a contraction of the economy since geopolitical, institutional, 
socioeconomic, and climatic events, and the unavailability of capital and labor can also reduce 
economic growth. Specification (II) shows that an increase of one percentage point of oil 
expenditure is correlated to a 0.60 decrease in US economic growth. When all fossil fuel 
expenditure (III), or all energy expenditure (IV) are taken into account instead of just oil, 
energy expenditure still has a statistically significant negative impact on economic growth, but 
the correlation is slightly weaker. An increase of one percentage point of fossil (respectively 
total) energy expenditure is statistically correlated to a 0.55 (respectively 0.48) decline in US 
economic growth. As shown by specification (V), this result is robust to the inclusion of 
several dummy variables in order to control for the impact of particular events. Capital 
investment is always positively significant at 1% level. Each point of investment as a fraction 
of GDP raises economic growth by slightly more than one percentage point. 
Surprisingly, the US unemployment rate is positively correlated with economic growth 
when the impact of energy expenditure and capital investment is also taken into account. To 
check this result, we made a simple regression of US economic growth on the US 
unemployment rate and found the classic decreasing relationship. Moreover, when we perform 
univariate linear regressions of the unemployment rate on capital formation (as a fraction of 
GDP) and on energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP), we find that the unemployment rate is 
positively correlated to energy expenditure (the higher the energy expenditure as a fraction of 
GDP, the higher the unemployment rate) and negatively correlated to capital investment (the 
higher the capital investment as a fraction of GDP, the lower the unemployment rate). These 
results indicate that the apparently strange positive correlation between economic growth and 
unemployment is not caused by a flaw in our data or methodology. The residual checks 
converge toward the assumption of normality of residuals and the absence of autocorrelation, 
although there is some evidence for the presence of heteroscedasticity, thus we use robust 
standard error. The CUSUM and CUSUM squared tests indicate that the estimated coefficients 
are stable overtime. 
 It is worth noting that performing the same multivariate linear regressions at the global 
scale yields very similar results, in particular the statistically significant negative correlation 
between energy expenditure and economic growth. We choose not to reproduce these results 
because the CUSUM and CUSUM squared tests indicate that the estimated coefficients are not 
stable overtime for this global approach. 
 
Maximum tolerable level of energy expenditure for the US economy 
Let us consider now the estimation of the maximum level of energy expenditure as a 
fraction of GDP, 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,  above which positive economic growth vanishes. Following equation 
(8), and replacing parameters 𝛼, 𝜃1, 𝜃2,𝜃3  by the estimated values of specification (IV) (so 
respectively, -0.28, -0.48, 1.31, and 0.61), and the mean values of capital formation as a 
fraction of GDP (0.2244) and unemployment rate (0.0598), we find the central value of the 
maximum tolerable level of total energy expenditure:  
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𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
0.28 − 1.31 × 0.2244 − 0.61 × 0.0598
−0.48
= 0.11. 
 
(13) 
Using a Wald test, we can provide a minimum and maximum 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 at 5% level. We find that 
0.09 < 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 < 0.131. This result means that, in the US, if the fraction of energy expenditure 
is higher than 11% of GDP (with a 95% confidence interval of [9%–13.1%]), economic 
growth is statistically lower than or equal to zero (all others variables being equal to their mean 
values). Using parameter values from specification (II), we can perform the same test for oil 
expenditure only and derived the maximum tolerable level of oil expenditure for the US 
economy, 𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑙, which is equal to 6% (with a 95% confident interval of [4.6%–7.5%]). Our 
results support the qualitative suppositions advanced by Murphy and Hall (2011ab) and 
Lambert et al. (2014). 
 
Maximum tolerable quantity-weighted average price of energy and oil for the US economy 
As shown in equation (9), we can reformulate equation (13) in order to get the 
expression of the maximum price of aggregated energy, 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥, and the maximum price 
of oil, 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥 , above which US economic growth should statistically become negative. 
Obviously, both estimates are absolutely not static but time dependent since for any given 
year, they respectively depend on the current total energy intensity and the current oil intensity 
of the US economy:  
 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 =
𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
=
0.11
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
, (14) 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙  𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 =
𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝐸𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
=
0.06
𝐸𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
. (15) 
 
Relation (15) describing the maximum tolerable price of oil as a function of the oil 
intensity of the economy is represented in Figure 5 for the US, and compared with the actual 
historical course of the oil price between 1960 and 2012. We could have easily drawn this 
figure for total aggregated energy but, given the importance of oil for the US economy, we 
think that focusing on the oil price is more advisable here. If we consider the last data point of 
the econometric estimation we have for year 2010, Figure 5 indicates that the price of oil 
would have had to reach 16977 $1990/TJ (equivalent to 173 $2010 per barrel) instead of its 
real historical value of 8315 $1990/TJ (84 $2010 per barrel), to annihilate US economic 
growth. Figure 5 also shows that in 2008 the oil price was pretty close to the “limits to growth” 
zone, and one must not forget that average annual values are not representative of extremes 
and potentially lasting events. Oil prices increased continuously in the first half of 2008 
reaching 149 $2010 on July 11. This supports the idea that the surge in oil expenditure at this 
time indeed played a “limits to growth” role in lowering discretionary consumption and hence 
revealing the insolvency of numerous US households. A preliminary additional mechanism is 
to consider that instabilities on the financial market in 2007 led numerous non-commercial 
agents to take positions on apparently more reliable primary commodities markets (Hache and 
Lantz, 2013). This move inevitably puts upward pressure on prices, and in particular the oil 
price, which increased energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP to the point of triggering a 
“limit to growth” effect. Similarly, from 1979 to 1982, the actual oil price was above or 
slightly below its maximum tolerable value, which explains that US economic growth had very 
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little chance of being positive during those years. On the contrary, at the time of the oil 
counter-shock of the late 1980s, the oil price was four times below its maximum tolerable 
level, so that the oil expenditure constraint was very loose at this time. 
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum tolerable price of oil ($1990/TJ) for the US as a function of the economy’s oil intensity. 
Minimum EROI required for having positive economic growth in the US 
As can be seen in equation (11), two variables are needed to calculate the minimum 
aggregated EROI, 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛 , required for having positive economic growth in the US: the 
maximum tolerable level of energy expenditure 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 previously calculated, and the average 
monetary-return-on-investment (MROI) of the energy sector. In Court and Fizaine (2016) such 
average MROI of the US energy sector is estimated between 1850 and 2012 with an average 
value of 1.158 (meaning that on average the gross margin of the US energy sector has been 
about 15.8%, with a standard deviation of 2%). Using this average value of 1.158 for the 
MROI, and the value of 0.11 previously calculated for 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 , we estimate that the US 
economy requires a primary energy system with an 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛  of 11:1 in order to enjoy a 
positive rate of growth. Taking the uncertainty range (at 5% level) of 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ([0.09–0.131]), 
and considering an MROI varying between 1.05 and 1.2, the sensitivity of the 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛 ranges 
from 8:1 to 13.5:1. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only three studies that discuss potential values 
for minimum societal EROI. Hall et al. (2009) offer a technical minimum EROI of 3:1 for oil 
at the well-head. These authors postulate (without explicit calculation) that a higher value of 
5:1 would be necessary to just support our current complex societies, but that a minimum 
EROI around 12–14:1 is probably necessary to sustain modern forms of culture and leisure. 
Weißbach et al. (2013) give a minimum required EROI of 7:1 for OECD countries without a 
clear explanation of the underlying calculation. Finally, the study by Lambert et al. (2014), 
based on simple (although nonlinear) correlations between EROI and the Human Development 
Index (HDI) in cross sectional data, arrive at a minimum required societal EROI in the range 
15–25:1 for contemporary human societies.10 
Now that we have estimated that, at current energy intensity, the US requires a 
minimum societal EROI of 11:1 (with a most likely interval11 of [8–13.5]) in order to possibly 
                                                     
10 In their study Lambert et al. (2014) define a minimum EROI in order to reach a minimum HDI which is quite different from our 
minimum EROI below which positive economic growth is statistically compromised. 
11 This expression is used because it is impossible to formally define a 5% or 10% confidence interval for the 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛. Indeed, 
such confidence interval is known for 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙, but not for the MROI for which only a standard deviation of 2% is known. Hence, 
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have positive economic growth, the temptation is to compare this value to the representative 
EROI of different energy systems in order to assess their “growth-compatibility”. Such 
comparison appears rather perilous. First, studies proposing EROI values sometimes calculate 
ratios of annual gross energy produced to annual energy invested which hence represent power 
return ratios (PRRs), or “yearly” energy return ratios (ERRs) comparable to our 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛; but 
more formally, EROIs should describe ratios of cumulated energy production to total energy 
invested, and such estimates can be found in the literature too. Second, there is no such thing 
as an “average representative EROI value” for a given energy system. Each energy system has 
a particular EROI that depends on the considered input boundary (see Murphy et al, 2011).  
The bottom line is that orders of magnitude of net energy ratios (be it ERRs or PRRs) are 
important, precise calculated values are not. Hence, the different numbers given here must 
absolutely be understood as representative orders of magnitude. Coal, oil, and gas have 
respective representative EROI values of about 80–100:1, 20–30:1, and 40–60:1. Hydropower 
projects have high EROIs of about 50–100:1 (but the global remaining hydro potential will 
probably come to saturation in a few decades). New renewable technologies toward which 
human future is destined have relatively lower EROIs, with average values for wind power, 
photovoltaic panels, and first generation biofuels respectively around 15–20:1, 4–6:1, and 1–
2:1 (Hall et al., 2014). Adding the intermittent nature of renewable energy to this perspective 
suggests that (so far) new renewable technologies hardly seem capable of coping with the 
minimum required societal EROI of 11:1 that we have calculated.  
For the sake of clarity, Table 3 summarizes different scattered results of this 
subsection 3.2. 
Table 3. 𝜷, 𝑷𝒎𝒂𝒙, and 𝑬𝑹𝑶𝑰𝒎𝒊𝒏 using parameter values from specification (IV) and (II) 
 
US total energy expenditure 
including wood (IV) 
US oil expenditure (II) 
𝜷 (%)   
Max 5% 13.1% 7.5% 
Average 11% 6.0% 
Min 5% 9% 4.6% 
𝑷𝒎𝒂𝒙 ($1990/TJ)    
Max 5% 12023 21347 
Average 10096 16977 
Min 5% 8260 12921 
𝑬𝑹𝑶𝑰𝒎𝒊𝒏    
Max 5% 13 25 
Average 11 19 
Min 5% 9 15 
Note:   𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥  estimates depend on the level of energy intensities taken here for year 2010, i.e. 10.9 MJ/$1990 for total energy and 
3.8 MJ/$1990 for oil only. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
the interval [8–13.5] was computed to simply get an idea of the sensitivity of the estimated average 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛 but this interval must 
surely not be taken as a formal result. 
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3.3 Granger causality relation between oil expenditure and US GDP 
growth rate between 1960 and 2010 
Over the period 1960–2010 for which we have uninterrupted year-to-year data, we 
performed Granger causality tests to identify the direction of the possible causal relation 
between the US level of oil expenditure as a fraction of GDP, US capital formation as a 
fraction of GDP, US unemployment rate, and the growth rate of the US GDP. Our results, 
presented in Table 4, show that we can reject at 5% level the assumption that the level of oil 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP does not Granger cause economic growth. For the reverse 
relation, the assumption that growth does not Granger cause the level of oil expenditure (as a 
fraction of GDP) cannot be rejected at 5% level. In summary, these tests indicate a one way 
causality from energy expenditure to economic growth at 5% level. Applying the same 
methodology, we also find a one way causality running from the US level of oil expenditure to 
the US unemployment rate (Figure 6). Finally, the Granger causality test also tends to confirm 
a feedback relationship between the US economic growth and the US unemployment rate at 
5% level. Furthermore, contrary to our static econometric results (Table 2), the impulse 
response functions estimated from the vector autoregression (VAR) used in Granger causality 
tests show in a dynamic way how a variable can be impacted by a modification of another 
variable. We found that an increase in energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) in a given 
year leads to an increase in the unemployment rate two years later and a decrease in economic 
growth in the three years following the initial rise in energy expenditure. Quite logically, we 
observed also that economic growth reacts negatively to a rise in the unemployment rate and 
positively to a rise in capital investment (as a fraction of GDP). 
It is worth adding that using total energy expenditure instead of oil expenditure in the 
same Granger causality tests yields identical results. However, with those data, autocorrelation 
problems could only be solved by increasing the number of lags in our relations. Considering 
the low number of observations that we have, this strategy reduces the robustness of these 
results and we consequently choose not to reproduce them here. 
 
Table 4. Results of Granger causality tests with different US variables. 
Dependent 
variable 
Sources of causation (independent variables) with 1 lag 
Oil 
expenditure 
GDP growth 
Unemployment 
rate 
Capital 
formation 
All 
Oil expenditure - 2.321782 0.278008 0.514794 3.049061 
GDP growth 11.61990*** - 19.58885*** 1.083957 25.73877*** 
Unemployment rate 10.22715*** 10.69602*** - 0.100274 46.42257*** 
Capital formation 1.243340 6.466733** 9.453183*** - 21.49198*** 
Note: To determine the lag order, we used the lag order chosen by the majority of information criteria (in our case 4 out of 5 
information criteria indicated an optimal order of one lag). We also checked that the VAR is well specified and that there was no 
persistent autocorrelation. *corresponds to the F-statistic result of the Fisher test rejecting the assumption H0: "the variable Xi does 
not Granger cause the variable Y" with a 10% risk level, ** 5% risk level, *** 1% risk level.   
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Figure 6. Relationships highlighted by our VAR regression for the US economy between 1960 and 2010. 
Let us summarize the results obtained so far in this paper on the “limits to growth” 
role of energy expenditure. (i) The level of energy expenditure in the economy, i.e. the amount 
of GDP diverted to obtain energy, seems to play a “limit to growth” role since as long as it has 
remained above 6–8% of GDP, high economic growth rates have never occurred for the US or 
the global economy during the last one hundred and fifty years. (ii) A statistically significant 
negative Granger causality was found from the US level of oil expenditure towards US GDP 
growth between 1960 and 2010. (iii) If the rate of growth of the economy is to be potentially 
positive (in the absence of other major limits of geographical, geopolitical or institutional 
nature), energy expenditure cannot exceed a certain fraction of GDP that we have estimated to 
be 11% for the US. (iv) This result can also be expressed as the necessity of having an energy 
system with a definable minimum EROI, estimated at 11:1 for the US. In the following 
section, we discuss some of these results.  
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Consistency and comments about our long term energy expenditure 
estimations 
Comparison with the UK on a larger time frame 
 Relying on the methodology presented in section 2.1 we have estimated the level of 
primary energy expenditure for the UK, for which Fouquet (2008, 2011, 2014) has provided a 
lot of very long-term (1300–2008) data and analyses. More specifically, the prices 
(£2000/toe12) and quantities (Mtoe) of coal, oil, gas, electricity, wood, and fodder consumed in 
the UK were retrieved from Fouquet (2008) for the period 1300–1699, and we used updated 
values from Fouquet (2011, 2014) for the period 1700–2008. UK GDP (£2000) was retrieved 
from Fouquet (2008). As our results in Figure 7 show, when energy expenditure is calculated 
as far back as 1300, ignoring expenditure related to food (supplied to laborers to obtain power) 
and fodder (provided to draft animals to obtain power) could lead to a huge underestimation of 
the past energy cost burden. Indeed, getting total non-human-food energy (but including 
                                                     
12 1 toe = 1 tonne of oil equivalent = 42 GJ. 
Capital formation
GDP growth
Energy 
expenditures  
Unemployement 
rate
+ - 
- - 
- + 
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fodder indispensable to obtain draft animals’ power) used to account for 30–40% of the 
economic product of the UK in the late Middle Ages, and adding human food energy 
(indispensable to obtain power from laborers) increases such an estimate to 50–70% for the 
same early times. Even in 1700, food supplied to laborers, wind used for ships and mills, and 
fodder provided to draft animals accounted for nearly 45% of the total primary energy supply 
of the UK, and still represented 20% in 1850 (Fouquet, 2010). Nevertheless, Figure 7 shows 
that, compared to the US and the global economy (Figures 2 and 4 respectively), the energy 
transition of the UK toward fossil fuels was far more advanced in 1850. At that particular time, 
coal expenditure was about 9.5% of GDP in the UK, but only 2% in the US, and 1.5% at the 
global scale. Furthermore, ignoring food and fodder as we did for the US and the global 
economy, the relatively low level of “fossil + woodfuel” energy expenditure of the UK 
between 1700 and 1800 is, to our mind, a clear sign of the decisive role played by cheap coal 
to give the UK a head start over other nations in the Industrial Revolution that ultimately lead 
to the Great Divergence among well-off western and less-developed eastern countries (see 
Pomeranz, 2000; Kander et al., 2013; and Wrigley, 2016).   
  
 
Figure 7. UK energy expenditure estimates from 1300 to 2008 with decomposition by energy type.  
 
Sensitivity analysis of the US energy expenditure to the GDP data 
In Figure 8 we test the sensitivity of the US total energy expenditure to the choice of 
the GDP estimate. As could have been expected, our total energy expenditure estimates are 
consistent after 1950 since international accounting rules have only been established after the 
Second World War. Before 1950, nominal GDP estimates and deflator estimates vary more 
widely among authors but it does not generate too important differences in our energy 
expenditure estimates. 
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Figure 8. Sensitivity analysis of US total energy expenditure to the GDP estimate source 
 
Consistency with Bashmakov’s “first law” 
According to our results, it seems that the “first energy transition law” postulated by 
Bashmakov (2007) concerning the stability of energy costs to income ratios (“with just a 
limited sustainable fluctuation range”) is valid for the post-Second World War era but not for 
earlier periods. On the whole, our results suggest that the ratio of US energy expenditure to 
GDP has decreased from an average value of 11% for the period 1850–1950 to a lower 
average value of 5.7% for 1950–2012. The fact that Bashmakov’s “first law” does not hold in 
the very long-term is even more visible if we observe the energy requirements of the UK 
between 1300 and 2008, as we did in Figure 7. 
4.2 Extension of econometric results : per capita GDP and threshold effects  
Regarding the diverse econometric regressions performed in this paper, an alternative 
approach might be to analyze the relationship between energy expenditure (as a fraction of 
GDP) and the growth rate of per capita GDP instead of total GDP as we did. We tested this 
option and found similar outcomes. We deliberately choose to focus our study on GDP growth 
and not per capita GDP growth in order to remain consistent with the existing literature.   
We could also suppose the existence of thresholds effects in the relationship between 
economic growth and energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) instead of the linear 
relationship assumed in this paper. This assumption is a key point of Bashmakov’s work 
(2007). Whether this relationship is linear or not (threshold existence) involves the presence or 
absence of trade-offs between high energy expenditure as a fraction of GDP (causing high 
effort of energy efficiency) and high economic growth. Unfortunately, considering the 
restricted number of observations (fewer than ten) that we have for high levels of energy 
expenditure, it remains quite complicated to derive robust econometric estimations for such 
high regimes. The use of panel data could be a good way to overcome this technical barrier, 
and this option might be explored in further work.  
Furthermore, we think other parts of our work should be replicated for other countries, 
especially developing ones. Developing countries should be in a position to devote more 
expenditure to energy (as a fraction of their GDP) due to the higher energy intensity of their 
economies, so indicating a higher 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  and a lower 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛 for those countries. This point 
remains to be confirmed. 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In this article we estimated the level of energy expenditure from 1850 to 2012 for the 
US and the global economy, and from 1300 to 2008 for the UK. Our results indicate that 
periods of high or suddenly increasing energy expenditure levels are associated with low 
economic growth rates: for instance from 1850 to 1945 (very high energy expenditure levels), 
from 1975 to 1976 (surge), and from 1981 to 1983 (surge).  On the contrary, periods of low 
and decreasing energy expenditure are associated with high and increasing economic growth 
rates: for instance from 1945 to 1973, and in the early 2000s. Over the more restricted period 
1960–2010 for which we have continuous year-to-year data for the US, we performed several 
Granger causality tests that consistently show a one way temporal causality running from the 
level of energy expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) to economic growth. Furthermore, we were 
able to show that in order to have a positive growth rate, from a statistical point of view, the 
US economy cannot afford to allocate more than 11% of its GDP to primary energy 
expenditure. This means that considering its current energy intensity,  the US economy needs 
to have at least a societal EROImin of approximately 11:1 (that conversely corresponds to a 
maximum tolerable average price of energy of twice the current level) in order to present 
positive rates of growth. 
Our results suggest two main facts. (i) Energy is crucial for economic growth, which 
tends to reinforce the conclusion drawn by the biophysical movement and weakens the 
mainstream position which sees energy as a common (if not minor) factor of production. (ii) If 
we take the societal EROI as an indicator of economic sustainability, it must be prevented at 
all costs from falling below its minimum threshold (estimated around 11:1 for the US). Such a 
decrease in societal EROI may arise in three different ways. First, it could arise from large fall 
in the energy production level, this is the position supported by the proponents of the peak oil 
theory. Second, the fall of the societal EROI could also occur because of increased energy 
investment levels (and associated increases in energy prices) in the different energy sectors 
due to the decreasing accessibility of energy (this is typically happening when the proportions 
of lower quality fuels such as shale oil and tar sands increase in the primary energy supply 
mix). Finally, the decrease in societal EROI could come from a combination of the two 
previous possibilities. Hence, like many before us, we recommend that a coherent economic 
policy should first be based on an energy policy consisting in improving the net energy 
efficiency of the economy. A “double dividend” would be associated to this type of measure 
because it would both increase the societal EROI (through a decrease in the energy intensity of 
capital investments) and decrease the sensitivity of the economy to energy prices volatility. 
This recommendation is supported by the crucial role played by energy efficiency both, in the 
level of energy expenditure spent as a fraction of GDP and in the determination of the societal 
EROI. 
After the two oil shocks, economic agents largely switched toward technologies that 
consume less energy, leading to a global fall in energy intensity (compared with the 1950s and 
1960s). This effort has enabled most industrialized economies to overcome the impact of 
higher energy prices on economic growth, while it has also increased the societal EROI of 
many economies. Two important questions remain. First, can new public policies adequately 
increase the energy efficiency of the economy even in low energy price periods?  This would 
be needed in order to prevent the impact of future energy shocks on the economy, which can 
occur for several reasons: the depletion of cheap and accessible fossil fuels, the adoption of a 
global CO2 price, or the decreasing availability of strategic raw materials that are of critical 
importance for so-called clean energy technologies. Of course, the energy rebound effect 
would have to be mitigated if we want to maximize the benefits of such a policy, which, 
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historically, seems to be rather difficult (Sorrell, 2009). Second, previous studies related to the 
determinants of energy intensity concentrated mostly on the decreasing dynamics of this 
variable. Implicit in this view is the idea of a possible infinite relative decoupling of GDP from 
energy. As we are personally convinced that macroeconomic energy intensities cannot 
decrease asymptotically towards 0 MJ/$ due to the law of thermodynamics, a promising 
avenue of research could be to identify this minimum level and when we are likely to reach it. 
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Appendix 
 
Tableau A1. Unit root tests for the different time series used in econometric tests. 
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller H0: Unit root KPSS H0: Stationarity 
  
Constant 
+trend Constant None Constant 
Constant   
+trend 
1960-2010      
US oil expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) -1.822384 -1.844912 -0.870011 0.122781 0.125029* 
US fossil expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) -1.687235 -1.710704 -0.674999   0.126273   0.127640* 
US total expenditure excluding wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -1.465321 -1.514866 -0.338669   0.144865   0.145643* 
US total expenditure including wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -1.427043 -1.463141 -0.356135   0.144510   0.146239** 
1960-2010 + dummies for 1974 and 1979   
 
US oil expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) -4.645914*** -4.569183*** -3.968411*** 
  
US fossil expenditure  (as a fraction of GDP) -3.855898** -3.839113*** -3.216946*** 
  US total expenditure excluding wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -3.391457* -3.332861** -2.655416*** 
  US total expenditure including wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -3.374901* -3.349661** -2.697435** 
  
1980-2010 
     
US oil expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) -2.544073 -4.054355*** -3.577915*** 0.318747 0.185862** 
US fossil expenditure  (as a fraction of GDP) -2.141382 -3.517222** -3.084142 0.339279 0.185632** 
US total expenditure excluding wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -1.664036 -3.305788** -2.801680*** 0.428181* 0.185309** 
US total expenditure including wood (as a 
fraction of GDP) -1.691725 -3.403323** -2.912801*** 0.448936* 0.184505** 
1960-2010           
US population -0.491776 1.621706 18.19552 0.954076*** 0.218951*** 
US population first difference -6.618667*** -6.349020*** -0.839929 0.383025* 0.108030 
US unemployment rate -2.987014 -2.977318** 0.019169 0.140524 0.124060* 
US capital formation (as a fraction of GDP) -2.784603 -2.201140 -0.637669 0.435677* 0.070891 
US capital formation (as a fraction of GDP) + 
dummy in 2009 -1.402460 -3.106758** -0.292106   
 
U S GDP growth rate -5.761052*** -5.535544*** -3.757663*** 0.284838 0.077606 
Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, ***1% level.  
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